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Amnesties in Transition: Punishment, Restoration, and the
Governance of Mercy
Kieran McEvoy* and Louise Mallinder**
Despite the much vaunted triumph of human rights, amnesties continue
to be a frequently used technique of post-conflict transitional justice.
For many critics, they are synonymous with unaccountability and
injustice. This article argues that despite the rhetoric, there is no
universal duty to prosecute under international law and that issues of
selectivity and proportionality present serious challenges to the
retributive rationale for punishment in international justice. It
contends that many of the assumptions concerning the deterrent effect
in the field are also oversold and poorly theorized. It also suggests that
appropriately designed restorative amnesties can be both lawful and
effective as routes to truth recovery, reconciliation, and a range of
other peacemaking goals. Rather than mere instruments of impunity,
amnesties should instead be seen as important institutions in the
governance of mercy, the reassertion of state sovereignty and, if
properly constituted, the return of law to a previously lawless domain.
INTRODUCTION
On 21 January 1977 the first act of the newly elected United States President
Jimmy Carter was to introduce an amnesty for Americans who had evaded
the draft during the Vietnam War. In making this hugely controversial move,
Carter's stated intention was to `show mercy' rather than continue to punish
those who were still liable to be arrested and prosecuted if they returned to
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the United States and in so doing to seek to `heal the nation's wounds' as the
country attempted to move on from its bitter and divisive conflict.1 As Carter
explained, `I think it's time to get the Vietnamese War over with. I don't
have any desire to punish anyone . . . Just come back home, the whole thing
is over.'2 While this article is not an analysis of the ways presidential
pardons and the like are used in settled democracies,3 it does explore the
same nexus of amnesties, punishment, restoration, and mercy in other
societies seeking to move on from violent conflict.
Amnesties are often framed as being necessary for `the greater good' in
such societies. In effect, victims of the most egregious crimes are effectively
asked to forego their individual desire for punishment ± often viewed as
synonymous with retributive justice ± in the interests of broader collective
objectives.4 The article draws on over a decade of fieldwork and from a
major database of over 530 amnesty laws in 138 countries between 1945 and
2011 created by Mallinder.5 In many of the countries studied, there is a
history of political or ethnic violence, a disregard for `the rule of law', and a
broad spectrum of differing levels of normative and practical attachment to
democratic values and practices. In such societies, law becomes an important
practical and symbolic break with the past, and rights discourses, in par-
ticular, are seen as key to publicly demonstrating a new found commitment
to legitimacy amongst the community of nations.6 In such contexts, account-
ability often appears synonymous with retribution and amnesties a byword
for impunity.
We begin the article by exploring in a little more detail the notion of
transitional justice and the historical and contemporary meanings of
amnesties in the field. We then examine the outworking of amnesties more
closely through three of the key themes in the punishment and society
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1 D. Schichor and D. Ranish, `President Carter's Vietnam Amnesty; An Analysis of a
Public Policy Decision' (1980) 10 Presidential Studies Q. 251±71.
2 L. Baskir and W. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the
Vietnam Generation (1978) 227.
3 J. Crouch, The Presidential Pardon Power (2000); C. Strange (ed.), Qualities of
Mercy: Justice, Punishment and Discretion (2001).
4 S. Cullinan, Torture Survivors' Perceptions of Reparation (2001), at <http://
www.redress.org/downloads/reparation/TSPR.pdf>; T. Madlingozi, `On
Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of Victims' (2010) 2 J. of
Human Rights Practice 208±28.
5 Since 1995 the authors have conducted fieldwork in a range of transitional or
conflicted jurisdictions which have considered amnesty or amnesty-like measures.
These have included Argentina, South Africa, Uruguay, Uganda, Colombia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Israel/Palestine, and Northern Ireland. This work was
variously funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Atlantic Philanthropies
and, most recently, the AHRC (Grant No AHRC AH/E008984/1 Beyond Legalism:
Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation).
6 K. McEvoy, `Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional
Justice' (2007) 34 J. of Law and Society 411±40.
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literature, namely, retribution, deterrence, and restoration. The article
concludes by examining the utility of the notion of mercy as a prism
through which to explore amnesties as a tool of peacemaking.
THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE CONTEXT
The term `transitional justice' can be traced to a series of debates in the late
1980s and 1990s on how to deal with past violence in societies moving out of
conflict or dictatorship.7 From the outset, in jurisdictions such as Chile,
Argentina, South Africa, Guatemala, and others, the field was marked by the
inherent tensions between principle and pragmatism. On the one hand, there
was and is a moral and political impetus towards punishing those who have
visited `extraordinary evil' on their victims.8 On the other, the legal,
practical, and political difficulties inherent in following through on such
impulses are manifest. In circumstances where there may be no strong
democratic tradition; where the military often remains powerful and
suspicious of democracy in general, and oversight or accountability in
particular; where the judiciary and police may be corrupt, incompetent or
disinterested; where rebels or militia may retain their capacity for violence;
and where political leaders are often faced with an array of pressing socio-
economic challenges ± it is perhaps little wonder that the tensions between
the demands of justice and the demands of peaceful transition are so
prominent.
In the two decades since the term was first used, transitional justice has
grown into a multidisciplinary field of scholarship, policy, and practice.
There are important documents produced by the UN,9 a vibrant national and
international non-governmental organization (NGO) sector, specialist
journals, university courses, a plethora of books, heated debates, and all
the other scholarly accoutrements that suggest a vibrant and energetic field
of inquiry.10 As argued elsewhere, what has given the area a particular
`swagger' has been the expenditure of billions of pounds on the creation of
ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), the
International Criminal Court (ICC), and hybrid courts (involving a com-
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7 R. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000); P. Arthur, `How `` Transitions'' Reshaped
Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice' (2009) 31 Human
Rights Q. 321±67.
8 D.F. Orentlicher, `Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime' (1991) 100 Yale Law J. 2537±615; M. Aukerman,
`Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional
Justice' (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights J. 39±98.
9 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice
in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (2004) S/2004/616.
10 C. Bell, `Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the `` Field'' or
`` Non-Field''' (2009) 3 International J. of Transitional Justice 5±27.
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bination of domestic and international law) in places like Sierra Leone and
Cambodia ± all of which are designed to try those deemed most culpable of
international crimes.11 The institutionalization of transitional justice in these
new legal bodies, the development and codification of a new body of
international criminal law (for example, via the Rome Statute which
established the ICC), and the increased importance of regional human rights
mechanisms such as the Inter-American Court have underlined the authority
and political importance of the field. As noted above, the dominance of
legalism tends to narrow perspectives regarding the most appropriate res-
ponses to human rights abuses towards predominantly retributive
responses.12 Certainly, the vast bulk of expenditure in the field is spent on
retributive trials.13 That said, transitional justice does encompass a range of
non-punitive measures designed to deal with past violence including truth
commissions, reintegration programmes for ex-combatants, reparations
programmes for victims, a plurality of forms of commemoration and
remembrance, and of course, amnesties.
AMNESTIES PAST AND PRESENT
Amnesties may be understood as the process by which states exercise their
sovereign right to mercy by extinguishing criminal or civil liability for past
crimes. In eradicating liability, amnesty essentially assumes that a crime has
been committed but seeks to negate the possibility of prosecution.14
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11 McEvoy, op. cit., n. 6.
12 For an overview see K. McEvoy and L. McGregor (eds.), Transitional Justice from
Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (2008); R. Shaw and L.
Waldorf (eds.), Localising Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After
Mass Violence (2010).
13 In 2006 the United Nations estimated that the cost of `a serious truth commission' is
usually $5±10 million. After significant lobbying and legal activism by victims'
campaigners in South Africa, the reparations paid to victims of apartheid totalled
$71,375,000. In comparison, the total cost of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) up until 2011 was $1,887,385,922. The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) appears to have stopped reporting their
running costs in their annual reports from 2000 when the figure for that year was
$86,154,900. The budget for 2010±11 rose to $245,295,800. Since it was established
in 2002, and having initiated a total of 12 cases, the International Criminal Court has
to 2011 cost a total of ¨732,647,100. For further discussion, see L. Mallinder and K.
McEvoy, `Rethinking Amnesties: Atrocity, Accountability and Impunity in Post-
Conflict Societies' (2011) 6 Contemporary Social Science 107±28.
14 W. Bourdon, `Amnesty' in Crimes of War A±Z Guide, at <hhtp//www.crimesofwar.org/
about/crimes-of-war/>. However, although the majority of amnesty laws apply to
past crimes, there are also many examples of `prospective' amnesties issued during
the conflict as a device to encourage combatants to abandon their cause, for
example, in Uganda, Algeria, Colombia, and Afghanistan. See M. Freeman,
`Amnesties and DDR Programs' in Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-
Combatants, eds. A. Patel et al. (2009).
ß 2012 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2012 Cardiff University Law School
Historically, amnesty laws were often described as `acts of oblivion' or
`legal amnesia'. Indeed, the word `amnesty', like `amnesia', can be traced to
the Greek word `amnestia', meaning `forgetfulness'.15 It is this linkage,
advanced by Ricúur who characterized amnesties as `commanded
forgetting' and a denial of justice which tends to dominate the literature.16
Like the right to punish more generally, the capacity to grant an amnesty
and, in Ricúur's terms, to command forgetting and forgiveness has long
been a key element of sovereign power. As Parker notes, `for as long as there
have been written laws there has been an institutionalized power of mercy,
pardon and amnesty'.17 As is explored below, the capacity for mercy and
benevolence from the sovereign through the granting of an amnesty was
arguably at least as important an exercise of power as the ability to visit
violence and retribution on the wicked or the vanquished.18
The historical granting of amnesties as a means to secure post-conflict
peace and stability and its relationship to `stateness' is also relevant. For
example, the signing of the 1648 peace treaties at Westphalia, which were
designed to end decades of sustained conflict in Europe,19 included a
provision that all `insults, violent acts, hostilities, damages, and costs' should
be `forgiven and forgotten in eternity'.20 At a practical level, the power to
utilize amnesties, whether individualized or granted to designated groups
after a war, evolved into a key element of post-conflict statecraft and
governance.21 In more recent times, in line with the changes in modern
warfare, amnesties have increasingly been introduced in response to internal
conflicts rather than international wars. At one level, they may be seen as a
compromise between former warring parties. At another, the granting of
amnesties also represents an important expression of state power and
sovereignty, part of what Scott has described as `seeing like a state',22
particularly when that authority has been challenged.
The exercise of state sovereignty in the guise of amnesties has been
qualified by the advance of the international human rights movement and the
elaboration of international human rights law. Since the end of the Second
World War the rise of human rights has been linked closely with the `fight
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15 Orentlicher, op. cit, n. 8, at p. 2543.
16 P. Ricúur, Memory, History, Forgetting (2003) 353.
17 R. Parker, `Fighting the Siren's Song: The Problem of Amnesty in Historical and
Contemporary Perspective' (2001) 42 Acta Juridica Hungaria 69±89, at 76.
18 A. O'Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice (2002).
19 J. Caporaso (ed.), Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order (2000).
20 H. Zepp-LaRouche, `The Treaty of Westphalia: A Precedent for Peace in the Balkans'
(1999) 1, at <http://www.schillerinstitute.org/strategic/hzl_t_of_w_0599.html>.
21 N. Weisman, `A History and Discussion of Amnesty' (1972) 4 Columbia Human
Rights Law Rev. 520±40.
22 J.C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition have Failed (1999).
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against impunity'. In the 1970s, crude `blanket amnesties' designed by the
outgoing military dictatorships in Latin America and elsewhere were
routinely afforded to the leaders, murderers, and torturers of the ancien
reÂgime who enacted unconditional amnesties to shield themselves from
prosecution. In recent years such amnesties have increasingly come under
attack from international and hybrid courts, universal jurisdiction proceed-
ings, domestic legal challenges, and civil society campaigns. Particularly
within South America, these challenges have restricted the scope of pre-
viously broad amnesties so that today their capacity to shield the perpetrators
of serious human rights violations is significantly diminished.23 Despite this
`justice cascade',24 the frequency of amnesties has been largely unaffected.25
Between January 1979 and December 2010, an average of 12.25 amnesty
laws were enacted each year around the world.26
It is the design of amnesties which has changed. In particular, as is
discussed further below, it is now relatively common to see amnesties linked
in some fashion to processes designed to encourage former combatants to
offer truth in return for non-prosecution. The strong gravitational pull
exerted by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the
field of transitional justice has seen versions of this model (exchanging
amnesty for truth) reproduced in the mandates of truth commissions in
Liberia and Timor-Leste as well as (arguably) in commissions of inquiry
such as the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in Northern Ireland where evidence given
by witnesses could not be used in any subsequent criminal proceedings
against themselves.27 Where an amnesty is linked to truth-recovery mech-
anisms in such contexts, the traditional notion that the crime has been
obviated is removed, and such crimes may be investigated, acknowledged,
recorded, and discussed in public discourse.28
In sum, a number of points need to be borne in mind as we seek to explore
how amnesties map onto the key themes discussed below. First, in historical
terms at least, amnesties have been associated with processes of `com-
manded forgetting' where not only were perpetrators `not punished' but,
also, victims and affected communities were in effect asked to obviate the
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23 L. Laplante, `Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional
Justice Schemes' (2009) 49 Virginia J. of International Law 915±84.
24 K. Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Politics are Changing World
Politics (2011).
25 M. Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice (2009) 4.
26 L. Mallinder, `Amnesties' Challenge to the Global Accountability Norm?
Interpreting Regional and International Trends in Amnesty Enactment' in Amnesty
in the Age of Human Rights Accountability: Comparative and International
Perspectives, eds. L. Payne and F. Lessa (2012).
27 Lord Saville of Newgate, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (2010).
28 J. Sarkin, `An Evaluation of the South African Amnesty Process' in Truth and
Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? eds A. Chapman and H. van
der Merwe (2007).
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memory of what had occurred. Second, as with the power to punish itself, the
power not to punish ± to show `mercy' ± in the guise of an amnesty is
intimately connected to the power of the sovereign and now the state and has
long been an important tool of post-conflict governance and peacemaking.
Finally, while the increased importance of human rights discourses and
international criminal law has shaped the contours and contents of more
recent amnesties ± often linking them to processes of truth recovery ± neither
their usage nor their political significance has diminished.
By far the most common rationale for punishing perpetrators in this field
is retribution, and so we begin with an exploration of its outworkings in
transitional justice. We then examine the closely linked claims that are
advanced regarding the secondary justification for punishment in this
context, namely, deterrence. Finally, in order to explore some of their more
potentially positive contributions, we examine amnesties from a restorative
perspective.
AMNESTIES, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LAW
The declared rationale (or in Hart's terms, the `general justifying aim')29 for
the creation of international penal processes tends to fluctuate in emphasis
between retribution and deterrence.30 In stressing the importance of retribu-
tion, for example, the ICTY has held that such a focus should not be
understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge but rather as expressing the
outrage of the international community.31 The issue of deterrence is dis-
cussed below but as scholars of international criminal justice and transitional
justice have detailed, retribution is in some ways the most obvious `fit' for
the often outrageous crimes to which transitional justice must respond.32 As
Beigbeder sums up, retribution is for many the `primary object' of inter-
national justice: its key role is to fight against the impunity hitherto enjoyed
by those leaders most responsible for grave violations of human rights.33
The notion of retribution as meaning that criminals should be punished
because they deserve it for what they have done is usually traced to
Immanuel Kant.34 For retributivists, the key mechanism for the delivery of
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29 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968).
30 R. Henman, `Conceptualizing Access to Justice and Victims' Rights in International
Sentencing' (2004) 13 Social and Legal Studies 27±56.
31 Alexsovski (IT-95-14/1-A) Appeals Chamber, 24 March 2000, para. 185.
32 R. Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (2002); M.
Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007).
33 Y. Beigbeder, International Justice against Impunity: Progress and New Challenges
(2005) 226.
34 See, for example, I. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part One of the
Metaphysics of Morals (1999, 2nd edn.) tr. J. Ladd.
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such legitimate punishment is the law.35 Crime is a breach of the law and the
response to that breach, punishment, must be legal. It must be authorized,
delivered, and regulated according to the law. While acknowledging the
centrality of law does not offer easy solutions to perennial difficulties such as
how to deal with unjust laws, contradictory laws or indeed behaviour that is
manifestly wrong but not criminalized in a particular society, it is a useful
axiom for this article. If we accept that punishment must be done according
to the law within the retributive framework, we must therefore examine the
legality of amnesties.
The legality of amnesties is regulated by both domestic and international
law. At the domestic level, all legal systems provide for leniency within
criminal justice processes, and this often regulates who can enact amnesties,
what crimes they can cover, and whom they benefit. Depending on its scope,
an amnesty can be lawful under domestic rules, but still potentially conflict
with international law.
Today, many policymakers, scholars, and human rights activists claim
that international law does not permit amnesty laws for the most serious
crimes and instead imposes a duty on states to prosecute.36 However, no
international convention has explicitly prohibited amnesty laws.37 Indeed, on
every occasion where an explicit prohibition or discouragement of amnesties
has been mooted in the context of a multilateral treaty negotiation, states
have demonstrated `a resolute unwillingness to agree to even the mildest
discouragement' (emphasis added).38 Without such an explicit prohibition,
discerning whether amnesties violate international law requires reading a
prohibition into distinct legal regimes: international humanitarian law (IHL),
international human rights law, and international criminal law.39 Further-
more, even for international crimes ± namely, genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity ± there are divergences regarding the existence and
scope of a duty to prosecute.
For crimes that are proscribed by international conventions, namely,
genocide40 and `grave breaches' of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
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35 L. Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution (2006).
36 See, for example, OHCHR, Rule of Law Tool: Amnesties (2009).
37 R.C. Slye, `The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General
Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?' (2002) 43
Virginia J. of International Law 173±248.
38 Freeman, op. cit., n. 25, at p. 33.
39 L. Mallinder, `Peacebuilding, the Rule of Law and the Duty to Prosecute: What Role
Remains for Amnesties?' in Building Peace in Post-Conflict States ed. F. Medjouba
(2012).
40 Article I of the Genocide Convention confirms that genocide `is a crime under
international law which [the Contracting Parties] undertake to prevent and punish'.
Article IV provides `Persons committing genocide or any other acts enumerated in
Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers,
public officials or private individuals'.
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Protocol I to these conventions relating to international armed conflicts,41 the
duty to prosecute has been described as `absolute' and mandatory.42 How-
ever, these conventions may not be applicable in many situations of mass
atrocity due to the limitations in their scope. For example, the Genocide
Convention restricts the definition of genocide to actions taken with an
`intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group'.43 Similarly, the duty to prosecute under the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I applies only to `grave breaches' committed during
international armed conflicts. However, since the end of the Second World
War, international wars have been rare, and today the majority of contem-
porary wars are internal armed conflicts, for which no explicit duty to
prosecute is contained in IHL treaties. In addition, even where treaties
contain an explicit duty to prosecute, current international practice, as
reflected in the statutes of the international tribunals, focuses on prosecuting
those who are deemed `most responsible' for instigating and ordering
atrocities. These conventions are not widely viewed as imposing an
unrealistic duty on states to prosecute all perpetrators of these crimes, and
instead, as explored below, there is scope for selectivity.
The treaty law governing war crimes committed in internal conflicts,
namely, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II, creates minimum standards of protection for civilians but
contains no duty to prosecute. Indeed, Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II
encourages States Parties to enact `the broadest possible amnesty' at the end
of hostilities.44 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has
reinterpreted this provision to cover only `combat immunity', with the result
that combatants who commit acts equivalent to grave breaches would be
prohibited from receiving amnesty. In its 2005 study of Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, the ICRC argued that its interpretation of
Article 6(5) has become part of customary law.45 However, the rather limited
sample of state practice on amnesties on which this conclusion was based is
by no means definitive.46
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41 Each of the four Geneva Conventions requires States Parties to respond to `grave
breaches' by searching for, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of grave breaches,
unless they extradite them for purposes of trial by another State Party. Additional
Protocol I extends the same obligations to punish to a wider range of `grave breaches'.
42 See, for example, M.P. Scharf, `The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the
International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes' (1996) 59 Law
and Contemporary Problems 41±61.
43 Genocide Convention 1948, Article 2.
44 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 8 June
1977, Article 6(5).
45 J. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian
Law, Vol. 1: Rules (2005) Rule 159.
46 Volume Two of this study looks at `Practice' and discusses six treaties (Additional
Protocol II, plus five peace treaties), which provide for amnesty; and 17 amnesty
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For war crimes committed in internal conflicts, as well as crimes against
humanity, the absence of any international conventions prohibiting these
crimes means that the existence of a duty to prosecute must be determined
from customary international law. Although these crimes are sometimes
prosecuted before national and international courts, these judgments are only
subsidiary sources of international law. Instead, Article 38 of the Inter-
national Court of Justice Statute requires that determinations of whether such
a duty exists under customary international law must be based on state
practice and opinio juris. This can include considering the existence or
absence of amnesty laws; examining state practice in mediating peace
agreements that include or exclude amnesty provisions, or exploring whether
states support amnesty processes either financially and diplomatically. Of
course, as noted above, state practice is also evidenced by the fact that states
have avoided the opportunity to include provisions prohibiting amnesty in
international conventions. As noted above, the extensive data gathered on
amnesty law enactment in the Amnesty Law Database by Mallinder, and
comparative research conducted by other scholars, contradicts the findings of
the ICRC study, and instead suggests that states continue to enact amnesty
laws even for the most serious crimes.47 Furthermore, some states continue
to support peace negotiations in which amnesties are agreed,48 and even
provide financial, logistical or personnel support to the implementation of
amnesty processes, such as the Ugandan amnesty which benefits Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) members.49 These trends in state practice have
encouraged several commentators to question the prohibition of amnesties
for crimes against humanity and war crimes in internal conflicts under
customary international law.50 As a result, in relation to international crimes
regulated by customary international law, it appears that the best that can be
argued at present is that the duty to prosecute is permissive, rather than
mandatory, which leaves more discretion for states to explore alternative
approaches to truth and accountability.
For serious crimes for which international humanitarian law or inter-
national criminal law may not be applicable, such as extrajudicial execu-
tions, sexual violence, slavery, and torture, scholars and practitioners have
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laws from 11 states. In addition, it looks to other sources of practice including
national legal provisions governing the grant of amnesty, military manuals, national
and international case law, and UN resolutions. However, in each case, the number
of sources employed is comparatively small.
47 Mallinder, op. cit., n. 26.
48 `Lay down arms, surrender ± European Parliament tells LTTE' Colombo Times, 6
February 2009; `U.N. Security Council Asks LTTE To Surrender' RTT News, 22
April 2009.
49 `World Bank offers over sh3 billion to resettle former ADF, LRA Rebels' New
Vision, 19 August 2008.
50 R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International
Criminal Law Regime (2005); C. Trumbull, `Giving Amnesties a Second Chance'
(2007) 25 Berkeley J. of International Law 283±345; Freeman, op. cit., n. 25.
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based their arguments on the existence of a duty to prosecute on international
human rights law. However, this duty is not explicitly mentioned in any
human rights treaty. In addition, where amnesties for serious violations have
been challenged before the regional human rights courts, only the Inter-
American Court has found that amnesties for serious crimes violate a state's
duty to prosecute. In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has
declined to proclaim an outright duty to punish. Instead, it has found that
states are under an obligation to investigate, but not necessarily prosecute.51
With regards to amnesties, it indicates that where amnesty laws prevent
investigations into violations of the right to life, they would violate Article 2
of the European Convention on Human Rights. Amnesties that coexist with
or encourage truth recovery may remain possible under this approach. The
contradictory approach of these institutions casts doubt on the extent to
which a universal prohibition of amnesty laws has become part of
international human rights law.
In short, we would argue that there is a gap between some of the more
grandiose rhetoric concerning the duty to prosecute serious violations and
the reality of state practice with regard to amnesties. The tendency to
overstate the clarity of international law as an element of social or political
claims making is perfectly understandable as part of broader efforts to
combat impunity. However, both international and domestic law accept a
role for prosecution and amnesties in transitional justice settings.
Other significant challenges for advocates of an exclusively retributive
approach in this field relate to selectivity and proportionality. Domestic and
international prosecutions following mass violence are by definition
selective.52 This selectivity can be manifest in the situations that prompt
the creation of ad hoc tribunals or hybrid courts, or the launching of
investigations by the ICC,53 which can be influenced by a `random con-
fluence of political concerns'.54 This selectivity in awarding such tribunals
jurisdiction can also influence the scope of their investigations. Furthermore,
in these sites, resources are usually geared towards gathering evidence
against so-called `big fish' and the most winnable cases, not necessarily the
ones which are most deserving.55 This illustrates that, as will be discussed
below in relation to certainty, punishment of all perpetrators is often legally,
politically, and practically impossible. In trying and sentencing a few
`officially guilty' perpetrators who clearly deserve to be punished because of
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51 For example, Aydin v. Turkey (57/1996/676/866) 25 September 1997.
52 Cryer, op. cit., n. 50.
53 A. Branch, `Uganda's Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention' (2007) 21
Ethics and International Affairs 179±98.
54 D. Amann, `Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide' (2002) 2 International
Crim. Law Rev. 93±143, at 116.
55 Drumbl, op. cit., n. 32.
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their crimes, retributive justice also produces many more `false innocents'
who arguably deserve to be punished as well.56
With regard to proportionality, precisely because of the nature of the
crimes involved, this too represents a test for the retributive rationale for
punishment in such contexts. Hannah Arendt famously observed that the
scale and the horror of the crimes of the Nazis was such that they `explode
the limits of law . . . For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough.'57As
Mark Drumbl has argued, a truly proportionate response to such crimes
might involve torture or group elimination wherein survivors would become
as depraved as their tormenters.58 If, following Arendt, we accept that the
search for proportionality in such circumstances is `inadequate and absurd
(emphasis added)',59 then surely this too weakens the case for an exclusive
focus on retributive punishment in transitional contexts and, by extension,
creates the space for exploring in a fairly cold-eyed and pragmatic fashion
the restorative potential of amnesties (as detailed below).
Before moving on to discuss the interrelated topic of deterrence, it might
be useful at this juncture to deal with expressive functions of punishment.60
For contemporary retributivists in particular, the expression of societal
disapproval of criminal behaviour is an intrinsic element of the punishment
process.61 This expressive function of punishment, demarcating the boun-
daries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour as well as underlining the
moral authority of law,62 is intimately bound up with what Hay63 termed the
`majesty' of justice or what Douglas calls the `spectacle of legality'.64 Of
course, the expressivist messages of international trials may become
distorted or blocked by entrenched cultures of violence, extreme nationalism
or narratives of victimhood. For example, there is quite a lot of evidence to
suggest that with regard to some of those who were prosecuted before the
ICTY, the status of some war criminals as `heroes' to their followers was
amplified by such trials.65 That said, the issue of public censure remains one
which much be engaged with in discussing the question of amnesties.
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However, carefully designed truth commissions with amnesty available to
encourage perpetrators to tell the truth and engage in efforts to repair the
damage done may have an even greater expressive potential. To provide a
concrete example, if the ICC's indictment against the Lord's Resistance
Army leader, Joseph Kony, were ever to be brought to court, it is certainly
arguable that the expressive power of his trial might well be `muffled' by the
court proceedings possibly being conducted thousands of miles from the
communities he terrorized in the comparatively plush surroundings of The
Hague.66 If Kony adopted the position of many other mass murderers by
denying or justifying his crimes, then the message might be all the more
diluted. Alternatively, would a properly constituted truth commission in
Uganda at which offenders admit their crimes provide a more powerful
spectacle as well as a more effective and impactive mechanism to deal with
the past violence of that region? Such a scenario is at the very least
debatable.
To recap, while the retributive rationale remains the most commonly
advanced in the field of transitional justice, it fails to retain its explanatory or
justificatory power when subjected to even the most basic analysis. The
obligation to prosecute under international law is less clear than is often
argued and amnesties can be, if properly designed and implemented, per-
fectly lawful. Indeed, as we suggest further below, where prosecutions are by
definition selective and where punishments can rarely be truly proportionate,
a lawful amnesty which requires the performance of certain obligations such
as occurs in a properly constituted truth commission may in fact be
preferable to de facto impunity where the vast bulk of perpetrators are
untouched by any legal process. Finally, while the expressive functions of
punishment must be taken seriously, we would argue that carefully crafted
restorative institutions can achieve the same goal.
AMNESTIES, DETERRENCE, AND THE RATIONAL ACTOR
Since crime and punishment have become serious areas of study, deterrence
has been advocated as a key justification for inflicting punishment. As
Jeremy Bentham summed up:
When we consider that an unpunished crime leaves the path of crime open, not
only to the same delinquent, but also to all those who may have the same
motives and opportunities for entering upon it, we perceive that the punish-
ment inflicted upon the individual becomes a source of security for all.67
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Leaving crimes `unpunished', as arguably is the case with amnesties, is an
anathema from such a deterrence perspective. Contemporary discussions on
deterrence tend to coalesce around two main themes. Specific deterrence
involves punishing offenders so that they think again before re-offending,
while general deterrence involves sending a message to others who might be
tempted towards crime in the future. For punishment to achieve both specific
and general deterrence, theorists have suggested that two characteristics
must be present. First, it is more important that punishment be viewed by
offenders to be certain, rather than severe, if it is to overcome the hope of
impunity in the offenders.68 Secondly, offenders must behave as rational
actors and incorporate the risk of punishment into their decision-making
process in order to decide whether the potential cost of punishment out-
weighs the benefits of engaging in criminality.69 However, as this section
will explore, the transplantation of deterrence theory from individual crimes
in ordinary criminal justice to situations of mass violence faces several
challenges.
In the field of international criminal justice, as noted above, deterrence is
the other principal rationale deployed in support of prosecutions70 and, either
explicitly or implicitly, in opposition to amnesties. This objective of inter-
national tribunals has been recognized to varying degrees in the case law of
the international tribunals. For example, the ICTR suggested the purpose of
punishing those guilty of international crimes, `over and above' the goal of
retribution, is `deterrence, namely, to dissuade for ever others who may be
tempted in the future to perpetrate such atrocities'.71 To support these
arguments, previous examples of a failure to punish and the consequent lack
of deterrence to future generations are routinely made. For example, the
former ICTY judge and prominent international law scholar Antonio Cassese
argued that `the impunity of the leaders and organisers of the Armenian
genocide . . . gave a nod and a wink to Adolf Hitler and others to pursue the
Holocaust some twenty years later.'72
In making assertions on the deterrent potential of prosecutions to address
mass atrocity, policymakers and scholars have often been highly ambitious.
For example, the term specific (or `immediate') deterrence is often used in
transitional contexts to denote a belief that lawful punishment can prevent
further violations and help to resolve conflict peacefully, even `in the
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absence of effective peace negotiations, economic sanctions, or the use of
military force'.73 Similarly, general deterrence has been adapted within
transitional justice literature to denote longer-term objectives within specific
states such as national reconciliation, democracy, and the re-establishment of
the rule of law.74 Indeed, deterrence has been used even more broadly to
convey ideas of deterrence that are `neither confined to a particular
individual or territory nor time-bound'75 but, instead, seek to promote
`general deterrence vis-aÁ-vis the world community'.76
Where human rights advocates make assertions about trials' deterrent
capabilities, they rarely appear to engage with criminological literature on
deterrence. Bill Schabas has suggested that many international lawyers'
pronouncements on the theoretical rationales for punishment are `marked by
amateurishness . . . driven more by intuition than anything else'.77 Certainly,
in reviewing some of the relevant judgments and academic materials, there is
a tendency to overstate the certainty and impact of the deterrent effect. While
claims with regard to the intellectual viability of deterrence continue to vary
within criminology, generalized claims such as those made by international
lawyers are now a rarity amongst serious criminologists. As overviews of the
vast quantitative, qualitative, and experimental literature on deterrence point
out,78 determining which individuals may be deterred from which crimes and
in what circumstances has remained a significant challenge for policymakers
and scholars despite decades of research on the topic. In addition to the
uncertainty on deterrence in general, there are specific challenges in transi-
tional contexts which should make any assertions even more tentative.
The first specific challenge is that in relation to international crimes,
`notwithstanding the fact that the prospect of getting caught is greater than it
once was, it still remains tiny'.79 This reality has been acknowledged by the
UN Secretary General, who, in an influential report, stated that `[i]n the end,
in post-conflict countries, the vast majority of perpetrators of serious
violations . . . will never be tried, whether internationally or domestically.'80
Even in situations where high-profile hybrid courts were established, only a
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handful of suspects were indicted ± five in Cambodia,81 13 in Sierra Leone,82
88 in Timor-Leste83 ± thus leaving thousands of other perpetrators benefiting
from forms of amnesty. These examples illustrate that the `certainty of
punishment' that Beccaria viewed as essential for effective deterrence to
operate is in reality lacking for serious human rights violations.84 This
clearly undermines arguments that rational offenders will be deterred from
committing international crimes by the threat of punishment.
The second specific challenge to the application of deterrence theory to
mass atrocity concerns the assumption of perpetrator rationality. For
Akhavan, the key aim of international justice is to make `a credible threat
of punishment' part of the rational calculation wherein the political censure
and international stigma associated with even being indicted (never mind
prosecuted) is factored in before someone deliberately unleashes murderous
forces.85 However, the assumption that the threat of international punishment
would affect the calculations of would-be directors of slaughter may be
misplaced, as often such individuals already face threats which are more
credible and more severe. While empirical studies are rare, one instructive
study found that of 485 African leaders who came to power since 1945, over
half were either killed, imprisoned or exiled.86 Another study found that 66
per cent of African leaders who led coups or attempted coups were killed,
imprisoned or exiled.87 In other words, people involved in leading the types
of groups which often carry out the worst types of atrocities are already
facing intrinsic risks in their political and military activities, and may be less
likely to be deterred by the rigours of international justice which may appear
less immediate and less onerous than is sometimes assumed by international
lawyers.
The relevance of deterrence theory to the `foot soldiers' who do the dirty
work of mass violence is, if anything, even more tenuous. Some of them are
coercively conscripted or recruited as child soldiers and thus their scope for
rational calculation is all the more reduced. For those who join voluntarily,
the risk of being killed or imprisoned by their opponents is much greater than
that of being indicted by a local or international court. In the case of
Northern Ireland, for example, all new recruits to the IRA were told that the
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most likely consequences of joining up were either prison or death.88 Where
individuals take such risks, the effect of the threat of prosecution is likely to
be questionable. To argue that rational calculation based on the remote
prospect of being indicted can play a significant part in these processes is at
best naõÈve. As Drumbl puts it, do `genocidal fanatics, industrialized into
well-oiled machineries of death, make cost-benefit analysis prior to
beginning work?'89 Once violence has been initiated, the mores, values,
and targeting strategies of armed groups or militias, their command structure
and levels of discipline, the perceived `justness' of the political or military
cause, and a range of other collective and environmental variables will often
determine the nature of the `crimes committed'.90
In sum, it is hard to argue against making dictators, warlords, and the like
think twice about their murderous intentions for fear that they may be
dragged to The Hague or a similar body at some future point. It is a different
matter to claim definitively that such individuals will be so deterred. The
decision of the Syrian leadership in 2012 to continue carrying out crimes
against humanity, notwithstanding the recent ICC indictments against
Libyan leaders involved in similar violent suppression of demonstrations,
and the clear threats from the UN that Syrian leaders would be next in line
for such indictments,91 speaks forcefully of the limited deterrent effect of
international justice.
In our view, it is therefore unconvincing to claim that the deterrent effect
of international punishment is so politically important that it rules out the
potential of other arguably more creative and ambitious measures such as
properly constituted amnesties. Although amnesties are today commonly
condemned for undermining deterrence and contributing to cultures of
impunity, for centuries, proponents of amnesty laws argued that they were
necessary to ease social unrest, prevent further human rights violations, and
encourage belligerent parties to sign peace agreements. This perspective is
apparent in the title of the UN's 1985 study of amnesty laws: `Study on
Amnesty Laws and Their Role in the Safeguard and Protection of Human
Rights'.92 Although these views are greeted with some scepticism today,
they continue to be invoked by some scholars and practitioners,93 and have
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been supported by recent experiences in some conflicted and transitional
states. For example, following the 2008 collapse of the Juba peace talks that
aimed to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict between the Ugandan
government and the rebel LRA, concerns have been expressed that the arrest
warrants issued by the ICC for the LRA leadership prevented Joseph Kony
from signing the comprehensive peace agreement.94 Given the seclusion of
the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, it is impossible to understand accurately his
decision to refrain from signing the agreement. However, it is apparent from
the LRA's sustained commission of crimes against humanity against
civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo that the arrest warrants have
not deterred them from violence.95
Although demands for amnesty made by war criminals or repressive
leaders in the midst of violence are clearly repugnant, where the threat of
ongoing or renewed mass violations is genuine, Freeman has suggested that
the international legal duty to prevent such horrific crimes, through measures
such as amnesty laws, should be balanced against the duty to prosecute under
international law.96 Where amnesty laws can be used to encourage com-
batants to surrender and disarm, or engage in peace negotiations, they have
the potential to make immediate contributions to deterring future violations
within the specific state. Furthermore, as the following section will explore,
where amnesties are conditioned on individual offenders engaging in restora-
tive and truth recovery processes, they can contribute to the reintegration of
former combatants into society as well as broader peacemaking goals.
AMNESTIES, RESTORATION, REHABILITATION, AND TRUTH
As noted above, amnesty laws are often framed by those who oppose them as
a more or less straightforward denial of justice.97 However, increasingly
within transitional states, the realities of amnesty design and implementation
are that they can and do coexist with, or are components of, broader
restorative justice processes.98 As is outlined below, we believe that the
locating of amnesties within the restorative justice framework (through
which we also discuss offender rehabilitation and the role of truth) offers the
possibility that rather than denying justice, amnesties can in fact be used to
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facilitate and enhance compliance with the rule of law, strengthen justice
norms as well as assist with broader processes of social and communal
`dealing with the past'.
Before exploring the utility of restorative justice more specifically with
regard to the question of amnesties, we would suggest a couple of cautionary
notes should be borne in mind. First, in deploying restorative justice
approaches to contexts of mass atrocity, it is important to acknowledge that
restorative justice cannot aim to `restore' relationships to some idealized
prior existing state.99 Loved ones who have suffered violent deaths cannot be
returned and decimated communities cannot be magically rebuilt. In
addition, previous communal relations may well have been discriminatory,
patriarchal or even violent. Therefore, restoration in such contexts may mean
something as relatively modest as creating conditions that make possible
peaceful and lasting coexistence.
Second, as Chris Cunneen has argued, the contexts under discussion
highlight the central role of the state in efforts to restore relations in such
societies.100 Often the state and its actors have been key abusers in the past
and it is important to bear in mind that the state has international legal
obligations and will inevitably bear a considerable responsibility in properly
resourcing, regulating, and contributing to whatever restorative mechanisms
are established.
Third, and closely related, restorative justice is sometimes accused of
narrowing the focus too much onto individual perpetrators, victims, and
communities. Not only must one bear in mind the role of the state and other
powerful actors in past violence ± what Mika and others have called the
dangers of `astructural bias'101 ± but also that in deploying the necessary
shorthand of victims and perpetrators, we remain cognisant that such
identities are by definition simplified and may well change, coalesce or
otherwise mutate in the messy realities of transitional societies.
The breadth of restorative justice theory and practice is discussed
extensively elsewhere.102 In this article, we are only drawing upon some key
themes that are of direct relevance to the question of amnesties. Restorative
justice is premised upon the belief that crime or anti-social behaviour is `a
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violation of people and relationships' rather than simply lawbreaking.103 As
a result, restorative approaches seek to identify the `harms' caused by the
offenders' actions to individual victims, their wider community, as well as
the harm caused by the punishment and stigmatization to offenders
themselves.104 Though initially used predominantly to deal with less serious
crimes,105 restorative justice is now promoted by some of its most prominent
advocates106 to deal with the very worst crimes imaginable. Its often
controversial and contested deployment to underpin, for example, the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa or post-genocidal Gacaca
hearings in Rwanda, or indeed the restorative elements of some amnesty
processes in different parts of the world, are proof positive of the increased
political and practical importance of the framework.
In terms of its direct relevance to the topic of amnesties, a number of
themes from the restorative justice literature are obvious. First, the fact that
restorative justice has become increasingly prominent as a result of a
widespread sense of exasperation at the failures of retributive punishment
chimes with some of the discussions herein. Second, in terms of offenders,
the focus within restorative justice theory and practice upon breaking cycles
of offending and facilitating re-entry back into the community (discussed
below) is obviously one of the key aims of any amnesty process. Third, with
regard to trying as much as possible to repair the damage done to victims and
society, as we will examine further below, the linkage of amnesties to pro-
cesses such as truth recovery, reparations, social healing, and reconciliation
is increasingly geared to achieving at least some of those objectives.
Many of the arguments outlined above regarding the limits of retribution
in transitional justice would resonate with restorative justice advocates.
However, one important caveat is worth noting at this point. Both Daly and
Duff have argued that restorative justice can in fact entail some form of
`punishment'. Daly has contended that restorative justice outcomes are
`alternative punishments' and not `alternatives to punishment'.107 Her
argument is that even well-intentioned `rehabilitative' measures may well be
viewed by those on the receiving end as `unpleasant, a burden, or an
imposition of some sort' and such methods should therefore be viewed as
punishment, albeit as part of a broader restorative process. Duff takes a
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similar view, describing his approach as `restoration through retribution'.108
By this, he too means that perpetrators can be compelled to partake in a
mechanism that is at some level painful or burdensome, where the offender
undertakes or undergoes a process of being confronted with his or her past
wrongs, of being censured, and of making reparation. While such views are
controversial in some restorative justice circles, for our purposes, we are
quite comfortable with the notion of amnesties as an imposition upon
perpetrators which may be painful or burdensome, which can entail forms of
social censure for previous crimes, and which require some efforts at
practical or symbolic repair for the damage that has been done. The key
challenge is to ensure that this is done in ways that do not humiliate the
offender and therefore render him or her liable to reoffend.
That challenge is famously referred to by John Braithwaite as `reinte-
grative shaming' ± finding mechanisms where offenders are subject to
expressions of community disapproval which are in turn followed by
`gestures of reintegration into the community of law-abiding citizens'.109
The alternative ± what Braithwaite terms disintegrative shaming ± is a
process that `creates a class of outcasts'.110 In subsequent work, Braithwaite
has explicitly held out the possibility of amnesties which are compatible with
restorative justice so long as they contribute to ending a war, so long as all
stakeholders are given a voice in the amnesty negotiations, and so long as
those who will benefit are willing to `show public remorse for their crimes
and to commit to the service of the new nation and its people and repair
some of the harm they have done' (emphasis added).111
Whether amnesties can fulfil Braithwaite's criteria might be best illustrated
by some concrete examples. Firstly, with regard to giving all stakeholders a
voice in the amnesty negotiations, historically, amnesties such as those passed
in Chile, El Salvador, France (in the wake of the Algerian conflict), and
elsewhere tended to be crafted by and in the interests of the political or
military elites with little if any heed given to the needs of victims.112 However,
in recent years, the feasibility of meaningful participation by victims and
affected communities has become more apparent. In Uganda, for example, the
mobilization which led to the Amnesty Act of 2000 actually came about in the
wake of a lengthy campaign by religious, cultural, and political leaders from
the region worst affected by the conflict between the Ugandan government
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and the LRA.113 Once the legislation was introduced, the Amnesty
Commission was required to co-ordinate a programme of public sensitization
to the amnesty as well as to consider and promote appropriate reconciliation
mechanisms in the conflict-affected areas.114 In Timor-Leste, following
complaints from local leaders that the transitional justice processes were being
dominated by international actors and political elites, the National Council for
Timorese Resistance (the UN's local governing partner) created a steering
committee comprising government officials, non-governmental organizations,
and international experts to consult on national reconciliation strategies
including amnesty.115 In Uruguay, an amnesty which was originally
negotiated in the wake of the handover of power by the military in the
1980s has twice been upheld by national plebiscites, the most recent in the
wake of a very lively civil society-led debate in 2009.116 In Northern Ireland,
local NGOs including some prominent victims' organizations have been at the
forefront of promoting ongoing debate and dialogue on whether non-
prosecutions should be on offer in return for an inclusive truth process.117
In addition, amnesty processes designed along restorative lines can also
be specifically constructed to include engagement with victims and affected
communities during the implementation process. In doing this, such
restorative processes can create a forum for achieving the restorative justice
goal of restoring relationships. In South Africa, for example, there was some
scope for the presence and participation of victims in the Amnesty Com-
mittee hearings.118 Victims' rights in these hearings included the right to be
notified of the hearings, to provide evidence that was taken into con-
sideration, to give formal testimony, to question amnesty applicants, either
personally or through legal representatives, and to make impact statements,
either orally or in writing.119 Finally, in addition to the Amnesty Com-
mittee's formal hearings, in exceptional cases following a victim request, the
hearings were accompanied by `behind the scenes interpersonal dialogues'
between victims and perpetrators, facilitated by TRC staff.120 Overall, while
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it can be justifiably criticized for a range of failings including excessive
legalism and a perceived pressure on victims to forgive,121 the South African
amnesty process did offer victims more extensive participation rights than
had featured in any previous amnesty around the world.
Other examples of amnesties have highlighted the potential for victim and
community participation at a localized level, in the towns and villages most
affected by past violence. For example, in both Northern Uganda and Timor-
Leste, traditional healing or reconciliation ceremonies have been used
alongside or within amnesty processes. In Uganda, these localized cere-
monies may include a cleansing ritual, nyono tong gweno ± the stepping on
the egg ceremony ± or two justice-and-reconciliation processes and
ceremonies, mato oput (drinking of the bitter root) and gomo tong (the
bending of the spears).122 These rituals variously require public confession
from the perpetrator, participation by victims' families, perpetrators, and
village elders, and some form of compensation ± usually livestock or small
amounts of money. Although the Ugandan Amnesty Act 2000 does not
require participation in such ceremonies, some participants have argued that
they were under orders from their local LRA commanders to participate,
confess their crimes, and ask for forgiveness.123 In Timor-Leste, individuals
who wished to benefit from an amnesty had to take part in a Community
Reconciliation Process (CRP) facilitated by the truth commission, during
which community members could listen to the statements of victims and
offenders, ask questions, and contribute to decisions on appropriate form of
reparations, including community work.124
Of course, amnesty-related mechanisms that facilitate victim or
community engagement are not a panacea for all ills. Processes which are
designed primarily by elites as part of a political deal always run the risk of
instrumentalizing victims or local communities,125 whose meaningful par-
ticipation can be seriously inhibited by knowledge or capacity gaps.126 Other
perennial problems of restorative justice remain, such as determining how
genuine an apology or an act of remorse is, how to prevent perpetrators from
promising too much, or how to prevent acts of revenge. If anything, these
challenges are felt all the more acutely in post-conflict efforts to involve
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victims and violence-affected communities.127 That said, as McEvoy has
argued previously,128 a criminologically-informed view of transitional
justice is alive to seeing challenges and to trying (at least) to meet them
rather than simply defaulting to top-down formalism which would simply
pass an amnesty act and make no effort to engage with either victims or
communities.
The second criterion suggested by Braithwaite is: does it `contribute to
ending a war'?129 We have interpreted this to mean not just is the amnesty
part of the process of ending violent conflict but also does it `work' in terms
of `identifying paths to prevention'? In exploring these ideas in the space
available, we will focus on complex issues related to `rehabilitation'. A key
element of the goal of restoring relationships is that offenders should be
rehabilitated and reintegrated into society rather than being alienated and
isolated through penal sanctions.130 The complex and controversial history
of how rehabilitation became a `dirty word' in criminology, was rebranded,
and at least partially re-emerged under different guises is beyond the purview
of this article.131 However, rehabilitation of offenders is a commonly
accepted rationale for punishment,132 believed to benefit not just individual
offenders, but also society by ensuring that the offender will no longer
commit crimes.133 Although rehabilitation of torturers and war criminals
may seem repugnant to large sectors of the population, particularly when it
entails decisions to remove or reduce punishments, it nonetheless has
become a feature of transitional contexts. For child soldiers, at least, the
responsibility to promote rehabilitation has been accepted within inter-
national criminal law.134 For adults, the rehabilitation of former combatants
is normally approached through the framework of disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and reintegration (DDR) programmes that entail removing and/or
destroying weapons, disbanding armed groups, and returning individuals to
civilian life.135
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Amnesty laws can play an important role in reintegrating offenders by
simply preventing the use of `isolating punishment mechanisms'.136
However, they can also contribute to creating conditions in which offenders
can fulfil their responsibilities to repair the harms they caused. At this basic
level, this can entail requiring combatants to surrender their weapons and
renounce violence within DDR programmes before they can benefit from the
amnesty.137 Although the sequencing of amnesties and DDR, the nature of
the conditions attached, and the extent to which any possible `stick' is
present (such as liability to future prosecution for non-compliance)138 all
vary, the linkage of amnesties and DDR has been broadly approved by the
UN, which encouraged `carefully crafted amnesties' as part of broader
efforts to assist in the return and reintegration of former fighters.139
In rehabilitation studies in general, the fact that rehabilitation appeared
regularly to fail in its stated task of reducing recidivism rates was crucial to
the erosion of its credibility as an underpinning philosophy of punishment. In
the realm of transitional justice, there is the beginning of something akin to a
`what works' movement.140 It is, however, in its infancy and is focused
primarily on the contribution of transitional justice mechanisms to the
achievement of broader social goals, such as democracy and peace. With
regards to recidivism rates, we are unaware of any meta-analysis on
reoffending rates for those who have been granted an amnesty. While there
are sporadic local studies which are encouraging,141 we do not believe that
there is sufficient robust data to say that amnesties either `work' or do not
`work' in simple recidivism terms.
As Braithwaite has noted, what is defined as `working' in a post-conflict
context where the overall aim may be something as grand as `the healing of a
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nation' is rather more complex than analysing reoffending rates.142 While
the engagement of former combatants who have benefited from amnesty or
amnesty-like provisions in further acts of political violence or even ordinary
criminality would certainly undermine the credibility of any settlement, we
would argue that this is actually quite a low bar to assess success. A strong
critique of DDR and its associated linkage with the notion of `rehabilitation',
and one which resonates with some of the literature on desistance by Maruna
and others, is the assumed passivity of the ex-combatant in such terminology
and practice. In this context, reintegration, resettlement, rehabilitation, and
the like are processes that are done to or for those who attend such
programmes. In our fieldwork in Northern Ireland and beyond, we have
frequently encountered strong resistance amongst ex-combatants towards
such a worldview. Instead, as McEvoy (with Shirlow) has argued elsewhere
with regard to Northern Ireland, success would also be better measured by
the extent to which ex-combatants exercise conspicuous agency and leader-
ship in peacemaking work, including healing relationships with victims and
affected communities.143 `Not reoffending' is simply not enough if
amnesties are to judged a success.
In terms of making a restorative contribution to social reconstruction
more generally, in the remainder of this section we will explore
Braithwaite's final criterion that requires offenders `to show public remorse
for their crimes and to commit to the service of the new nation and its
people and repair some of the harm they have done' by considering the link
between amnesties and truth recovery. As noted above, although amnesty
laws were historically perceived as acts of legal forgetting, in recent years,
several truth recovery processes have been empowered to hear testimony
from offenders and to offer incentives such as amnesty to encourage them
to recount their crimes.
Transitional justice scholars and activists commonly argue that such truth
recovery is important for preventing a repetition of crimes and contributing
to the healing of victims and society.144 Parmentier et al. also contend that
the process of testifying encourages offenders `to tell their own story and
allow them to gain back the control over their position and their role in the
conflict, and later also their place in the community'.145 Gathering and
analysing testimonies from former combatants may in turn contribute to
social understanding of the causes of the violence. Furthermore, through
publicly answering for their actions, offenders are subjected to different
forms of accountability.146 At a more general level, whilst an accepted
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version of the truth with regard to past violence may well be unobtainable,
the process of assembling, presenting, and testing the myriad versions of
`truth' does at least (to borrow a phrase from Ignatieff), `narrow the range of
permissible lies' in such societies.147 Amnesties are a central part of that
process. By creating space for offender accounts, they can contribute to the
development of richer, more inclusive narratives on which a shared history
can be formed.148
Again, the most high-profile example of exchanging amnesty for truth
occurred as part of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Under the legislation that established the TRC, perpetrators were required to
disclose fully their political offences in order to obtain amnesty.149
Following a challenge by the family of anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko
who was murdered in police custody, the South African Constitutional Court
underlined the amnesty's importance for overall truth recovery and national
reconciliation in upholding its legality.150 As noted above, the procedures of
the TRC's Amnesty Committee in receiving and processing offender
testimony have been criticized for taking a narrow, legalistic, and somewhat
inconsistent approach towards what offenders were required to disclose. In
turn, the unwillingness of large numbers of offenders to apply or to disclose
certain crimes created further gaps in the information revealed.151 Despite
the difficulties with the mandate, resources, and proceedings of the Amnesty
Committee, it is widely accepted that the process obtained more truth than
would have been possible without the offer of amnesty.152 In its final report,
the TRC argued that even if trials had been pursued, they `would probably
have contributed far less than did the amnesty process towards revealing the
truth about what had happened to many victims and their loved ones'.153
The importance of truth as a corrective to the amnesia effect sometimes
associated with amnesties was well illustrated in a recent case concerning a
controversial former member of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military
wing of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Robert McBride.
McBride bombed a bar in Durban in 1986 in which three civilians were
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killed and 69 people injured and was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. He was subsequently released as part of the political negotiations, and
applied for and was granted an amnesty by the TRC. In 2003, Mr McBride
was in line for a senior policing appointment, and the Citizen newspaper
(which was vehemently opposed to his appointment) published a number of
critical articles referring to him as a murderer and a criminal. Mr McBride
sued for defamation, arguing that the amnesty granted to him meant that he
could not be so described. The Constitutional Court found against Mr
McBride, arguing that:
The statute's aim was national reconciliation, premised on full disclosure of
the truth. It is hardly conceivable that its provisions could muzzle truth and
render true statements about our history false.154
It further concluded that although the amnesty in effect expunged the murder
in terms of its impact on Mr McBride's civic right to employment, to run for
office, and so forth, it did not mean that newspapers or citizens had to
conduct discourses on the past as if events had not happened.155 The linkage
of the amnesty to truth recovery in this context did not require or facilitate
`commanded forgetting' (as Ricúur has suggested), quite the opposite.
Rather, amnesties were one element of a broader architecture which, while
intended to achieve national reconciliation, did not impede a robust `warts-
and-all' public discussion about a violent past.
In sum, we would argue that viewed from the restorative perspective,
amnesties have a key role to play in transitional contexts. Carefully designed
restorative amnesties can help foster the rebuilding of relationships shattered
by mass violence, by facilitating an inclusive, participative dialogue both on
the need for amnesty and on the implementation of amnesty processes. In
particular, where the granting of amnesty is conditioned on individual
offender participation, they can contribute to offender rehabilitation by
offering an alternative to penal sanctions, and by creating a forum for
offender narratives to be told and incorporated into national truth recovery
projects. In such contexts, rather than being a denial of justice, amnesty laws
can in fact complement restorative justice principles and objectives.
CONCLUSION: AMNESTIES AND THE GOVERNANCE OF MERCY
In this final section of our analysis of the relationship between amnesties,
punishment, restoration, and transitional societies, we wish to focus on the
notion of mercy. The concept of mercy is a complex one, much discussed in
philosophy, theology, literature and, of course, theoretical writings on
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punishment.156 Doing justice to that rich literature is beyond the space
available; rather, we hope to focus on a number of discrete themes which are
most relevant for our argument. We are drawn to the idea of mercy because of
its history as an expression of the power of the sovereign, because it requires
us to ask important governmentality-style questions (who is being merciful to
whom and for what end), and because it compels us to look more closely at
the centrality of law to debates on mercy and punishment. In particular, as
Duff has argued, whether or not mercy should be viewed as something that
`rather intrudes into the criminal law, as a voice that speaks from outside the
law in tones that belong to distinct normative perspectives'.157
While there are multiple definitions, Dan Markel's description of mercy
as `the remission of a deserved punishment in part or in whole' will suffice
for current purposes.158 As noted above, much of the literature on the topic
begins with the premise that mercy is closely associated with notions of state
sovereignty and the exercise of state power. Schmitt, for example, refers
explicitly to pardons and amnesties as examples of the `omnipotence of the
modern law giver'.159 Similarly, Weber describes mercy as combining rigid
tradition with `a sphere of free discretion and the grace of the ruler'.160
Douglas Hay's seminal work on late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century
England charted England's infamous `bloody code' where the range and
severity of its penal sanctions made its laws appear the most punitive in
Europe.161 However, as Hay argues persuasively, such excess was tempered
in practice by a calibrated deployment of mercy so that such `benevolence'
was at least as important as terror in protecting the interests of the ruling
elites. While the transition towards democracy may somewhat obscure the
visibility of power, as Strange has argued, the exercise of mercy ultimately
expresses `the politics of rule'.162
While amnesties remain intimately bound up with state power, the power
relations at work in contemporary amnesties are much more complex than
simply an expression of the will of the sovereign. Amnesties usually come in
the wake of a direct challenge to the state's monopoly on the use of force. In
such contexts, the exercise of power may be fragile, contingent, and certainly
contested. Indeed, in such contexts, amnesties may be more an effort to
garner or consolidate state power rather than an expression of dominance.
Amnesties, like punishment, are, in our view, a particularly important
realm of governance in transitional contexts. As Garland, Simon, Loader and
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Walker, and others have demonstrated in different ways over the last decade,
it is precisely because notions of punishment, crime or security are so central
to contemporary notions of governance that they have come to occupy an
arguably over-privileged space in the social, political, and cultural lives of
many societies.163 To paraphrase Simon,164 crime and related discourses on
how to deal with it are much more than `one social problem' amongst many
in the modern era. Instead, these realms involve a range of actors and
provide techniques, rationales, and visions for governance that map onto
much broader understandings of social and political relations in the material
and `imagined communities' in which they are located.165 They offer points
of resistance, acquiescence, mobilization, and realignment in horizontal and
vertical power relations, which are often much more subtle than the will of
the most powerful political and military actors on the stage.
Amnesties, precisely because they are seen by some as an endorsement of
past crimes, a denial of justice, and a potential threat to future security (for
example, because they encourage cultures of impunity),166 occupy a
similarly complex space in the political and social lives of the societies
into which they are introduced. As in settled democracies, the politics of who
is entitled to mercy in what circumstances are almost inevitably a source of
controversy and division. Decisions on whether or not an amnesty should be
introduced; which actions are `deserving' of an amnesty and which are
excluded; the definitional wranglings on whether amnesty beneficiaries are
combatants, perpetrators, criminals, heroes or victims; questions of the
linkage to truth, reparations, and all of the other discussions outlined above
speak directly to fundamentally contested versions of the past and indeed
often the future of transitional societies.
Thinking about amnesties in South Africa, Sierra Leone, Uganda or
indeed Northern Ireland therefore requires a close grasp of local material and
`imagined' politics, a nuanced understanding of the rules (discussed below),
and a feel for the key actors and in particular what Foucault referred to as
grasping the `technologies of the self' (the ways that different people and
groups see themselves as both exercisers and subjects of power).167 The
design and implementation of amnesties can no longer be caricatured as the
last act of the outgoing general as he signs the sweeping amnesty to protect
now and forever all loyal assassins and toenail pullers just before departing
the presidential palace. As well as being fettered by law, the shape and
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content of amnesties is also influenced by a myriad of other factors including
the views and input of the international community; the level of organization
of victims, ex-combatants, human rights activists, and other civil society
actors; the particular history of conflict; the relations between key political
parties; the socio-economic context; and various other factors. In short,
understanding amnesties as mercy is useful because it directs us to the
intersection between law, punishment, and governance but it also demands a
fully-rounded grasp of the local power relations in order to do it justice.
Finally with regard to the `rules', as David Garland reminds us in his
panoramic discussion of punishment and its multiple meanings, at its core,
punishment is `the legal process whereby violators of the criminal law are
condemned and sanctioned in accordance with specified legal categories and
procedures'.168 Unlike scholars such as Duff and others who tend to regard
mercy in the ordinary criminal justice system as something which is essen-
tially `intruding' from outside, we would argue that in the world of transi-
tional justice amnesties represent an attempt to turn what was historically
untrammelled power into a creature of law. Amnesties usually require
legislation, they must be compliant with international law, they often entail
the creation of some kind of commission that must make decisions against
declared criteria, they may be subject to judicial scrutiny, and so forth. In
short, the institutional requirements of establishing an amnesty process may
be viewed as part of what Bourdieu has termed `the force of law', its `pull'
wherein aspects of social or political life are shaped by what he terms the
`juridical field'.169 Although, as commentators such as de Sousa Santos have
argued, this `creeping legalism' is certainly not an unadulterated force for
good,170 in the case of amnesties which were traditionally an example par
excellence of unfettered state power, it is hard to argue against some checks
and balances, or requirement for forms of restoration where previously there
were none. More broadly, by legalizing this sphere, however imperfectly,
one at least creates a structure or a process whereby those who would have
hitherto enjoyed either complete de facto or de jure impunity from any legal
process must subject themselves to a legal framework. Properly constituted,
amnesties bring law to a previously lawless domain in the exercise of post-
conflict mercy.
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